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TORTS-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
There were over forty appellate decisions during the past year in
the field of Torts. All but about half a dozen of these involved Negli-
gence, and half of the Negligence cases involved traffic accidents. A
reading of this latter group is well calculated to induce an automobile
driver to use more care in the future.
I. NEGLIGENCE
1. In General
In the great majority of Negligence cases the defendant owes the
plaintiff a duty to use care. As Judge Howard expressed it in Monday
v. Millsaps:1 "Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such
a position with regard to another that it is obvious that he must use
care to avoid injury to such other person, the duty at once arises to
exercise care to avoid the danger commensurate with the circum-
stances."2 The statement is a little too broad to apply as a generaliza-
tion in all negligence cases, but it is quite appropriate for all but a few
exceptions.8
The principal question in most negligence cases is whether the
defendant violated the duty to use care. This decision of whether
there has been a breach of the duty-whether defendant has- been
negligent-is a question normally for the jury to decide. It is normally
called a question of fact, though it is actually a mixed question of law
and fact involving the determination of what the facts were and the
application of a general standard to them. But, "[w]here only one
conclusion can be reasonably reached from the evidence and inferences
it is proper for a trial court to direct a verdict.
' 4
Several cases during the year have turned on the issue of whether
there was sufficient evidence of negligence to go to the jury. The
appellate courts have been careful to preserve the function of the
jury and have frequently affirmed jury verdicts on the ground that
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 264 S.W.2d 6, 15 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
2. At another place on the same page he says, "Every person is under a
duty to exercise his senses and diligence in his actions in order to avoid
injuries to others."
3. See, for example, Evens v. Young, 264 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1954), to be
discussed later, holding that no duty to use care regarding the condition of a
house is owed to the vendee by the vendor.
4. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
5. Two cases [Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953);
and Hale v. Rayburn, 264 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953)] made a
point of quoting the following sentence from Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros.,
175 Tenn. 535, 538, 136 S.W.2d 495, 496 (1940): "[Aippellate courts [ought]
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the case was properly submitted 6 or have reversed the action of the
trial court in directing a verdict.7 On the other hand there are several
cases in which a directed verdict was affirmed s or the trial court was
reversed for submitting the case to the jury.0
2. Standard of Care
The normal way of submitting to the jury the question of whether
the defendant (or plaintiff) has been negligent is to give them a
general standard rather than a specific rule of conduct to use as the
test. This standard is expressed in terms of what a reasonable, prudent
person would do under the same or similar circumstances. It affords
the jury wide administrative discretion and permits decisions on
particular facts without setting precedents which will be controlling
for the future fact situations.10
Occasionally, however, the court changes from the general practice
and lays down a specific rule of conduct. The most famous example
of this is the stop-look-and-listen rule once announced by the United
States Supreme Court and followed in some states.1 ' Another is the
assured-clear-distance-ahead rule, the rule that a motorist should
not lightly to assume the primary duty of determining liability or nonliability,
in actions of tort, but [ought] to leave that duty where the Constitution has
placed it, with the jury, as triers of facts, and if they act capriciously and
arbitrarily to supervise their action." The statement was originally used in
connection with causation but was quoted in regard to negligence.
6. Memphis v. Uselton, 260 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953) (gas ex-
plosion in relaying gas lines to widen streets); Rural Education Ass'n v.
Anderson, 261 S.W.2d 151 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953) (patient fell from upper-
story window of hospital); Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App,
E.S. 1953) (highway collision); Hale v. Rayburn, 264 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1953) (pedestrian struck by car); Strickland Transp. Co. v. Douglas 264
S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953) (car hit parked trailer); White v, geier,
264 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) (highway collision).
7. Hammons v. Walker Hauling Co., 263 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1953) (highway
collision).
8. Chaffin v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R., 36 Tenn. App. 580, 259 S.W.2d 877
(M.S. 1953) (action under F.E.L.A.); Harding v. Moore, 262 S.W.2d 702 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1953) (highway collision); Lawson v. Chattanooga, 263 S.W.2d 538
(Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) (defective wiring); Hawkins v. Clinchfield R.R., 266
S.W.2d 840 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) (action under F.E.L.A.).
9. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Katzman, 195 Tenn. 127, 258 S.W.2d 730
(1953) (railroad passenger injured by third party); Rowan v. Sauls, 195 Tenn.
573, 260 S.W.2d 880 (1953) (car owner allowed person with limited license to
drive); Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 260 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952)
(bus passenger injured by sudden stop); Knoxville v. Cooper, 265 S.W.2d 893
(Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) (depression in city street). Cf. Davidson v. Burger,
S6 Tenn. App. 486, 259 S.W.2d 541 (M.S. 1952) (automobile accident), where
the court found there was insufficient basis to allow the jury to find a car
passenger contributorily negligent.
10. Sometimes a standard is submitted in terms of "gross negligence." This
was held inappropriate in Shew v. Bailey, 260 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1951), where defendant exercised improper judgment in thinking he could
cross an intersection before another vehicle reached him.
11. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24, 72 L. Ed.
167 (1927). The doctrine was substantially modified by Pokora v. Wabash
R.R., 292 U.S. 98, 54 Sup. Ct. 346, 78 L. Ed. 1149 (1934). Its importance in
the federal courts was diminished by the decision of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
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drive within the range of his headlights. This rule was adopted in
several states, including Tennessee. 2 But, in accordance with the
general trend away from such rules, it has been repudiated in some
states and qualified in others. In Tennessee, also, the edge of the rule
has been greatly dulled by later decisions.'3 The case of Strickland
Transp. Co. v. Douglas4 has now further blunted it and made it almost
ineffective.
There the plaintiff was driving down Main Street in Memphis at
night. He passed under a brightly lighted viaduct, and as he came
to the street beyond (well lighted but not so brightly, and with cars
coming in the opposite direction), a car honked from behind. He
pulled over to the right and hit the defendant's trailer-truck, parked
on the side of the street. The court held that the issue of plaintiffs
negligence was properly left to the jury and said:
"We think that the law in Tennessee today as developed by the cases
• . . is that the assured clear distance rule does not apply where the
motorist encounters a dangerous situation which in the exercise of
reasonable care he had no reason to expect, and that drivers must use
reasonable care under the circumstances which exist at the particular
time, and the standard for such reasonable care is flexible, some occasions
and sets of circumstances requiring a higher degree of care than others
and that, therefore, the question of whether a plaintiff under a certain set
of circumstances did or did not exercise the required standard of care is
a question for the jury to determine."15
It is apparent that an instruction based on this quotation will usually
leave the jury free to apply the general standard when it sees fit. The
result is in accord with the modern trend.' 6
3. Violation of Statute
There is one situation where the general standard of care is quite
generally reduced to a specific rule. This is when there is an applicable
statute (or ordinance) -usually a traffic regulation or a criminal
statute. A substantial majority of the states, including Tennessee,
hold that violation of such a statute amounts to negligence per se, and
that the jury's function is to determine whether the statute was vio-
lated, not whether the actor's conduct was reasonable.
Most of the cases during the past year involved traffic statutes.
12. West Const. Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S.W. 301 (1914).
13. See Main Street Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 166 Tenn. 482, 63 S.W.2d
665 (1933); Halfacre v. Hart, 192 Tenn. 342, 241 S.W.2d 421 (1951), 5 VAND. L.
REV. 250 (1952).
14. 264 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
15. Id. at 237 (Carney J.). Judge Swepston dissented.
16. See PROSSER, TORTS 287 (1941); James & Sigerson, Particularizing Stand-
ards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REv. 697, 704-09 (1952).
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Thus Shew v. Bailey 7 involved an ordinance requiring stopping for a
through street and the statute providing that when cars meet at an
intersection the one on the right has the right of way. Adams V.
Brown 8 involved the statute requiring a signal before turning to
the left and the statute prohibiting passing another vehicle at an
intersection. Coffee v. Logan involved the statute providing for
right of way between pedestrian and motorist at an intersection.
Strickland Transp. Co. v. Douglas"0 involved an ordinance prohibiting
parking of a non-self-propelling vehicle without means of movement.
There are several possible legal methods for avoiding application
of the doctrine of negligence per se. One of these is by resort to the
requirement of causation. Usually this is accomplished by holding
that the plaintiff does not come within the group of persons which the
statute was intended to protect or that his injury does not come within
the hazards which the statute was intended to protect against. In
Adams v. Brown,21 however, the court talked only in terms of proxi-
mate and remote cause, and held that the jury might find that plain-
tiff's violation of a statute was not a proximate cause of her injury.
Another method is by interpretation of the statute. This method is
well illustrated in Coffee v. Logan,2 where pedestrians made a slight
variation from a crosswalk and were struck by a motorist.23 The
court holds the statute applicable in Shew v. Bailey,24 but Judge An-
derson gives a valuable interpretation of Code Section 2687, providing
that when two vehicles approach an intersection at approximately the
same time, the one on the right has the right of way. The case also
indicates that one may be found guilty of negligence in failing to stop
at a main thoroughfare which he knew to be a through street, even
though the particular type of warning sign required by the ordinance
was absent.
4. Proof of Negligence
The normal way of proving negligence is to introduce direct testi-
mony of what the party did or failed to do. Sometimes expert testi-
mony is used.25 On occasion, direct evidence is not available and
17. 260 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
18. 262 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
19. 262 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
20. 264 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
21. 262 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
22. 262 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
23. "Such regulations are to be given a reasonable construction.... It seems
to us impolitic to hold that a slight deviation from a crosswalk, such as here
involved, would place pedestrians as a matter of law beyond the protection
of traffic controls designed for their protection." Id. at 84. There is also con-
siderable discussion of proximate cause in this case.
24. 260 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
25. Thus expert testimony was used in Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6
(Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) to determine speed from skid marks. Compare the




sometimes the fact that the accident happened or the injury was in-
curred is sufficient in itself to give rise to a logical inference that the
party must have been negligent. Circumstantial evidence should be
as useful and as meaningful in a negligence case as in any other type
of case.
But circumstantial evidence in negligence cases has become mixed
up with the Latin phrase res ipsa 7oquitur, and a complicated set of
rules has developed around the doctrine. These rules have tended
on occasion to become ends in themselves and to obscure the real basis
for their existence. This is recognized in Sullivan v. Crabtree,6 where
Judge Felts' excellent opinion may well become the leading treatment
of the subject in the state.
The action was brought against the driver of a motor truck for the
death of a guest in the cab. Traveling down a mountainside, the driver
lost control and the truck swerved from the right side of the road to
the left and down an embankment, crushing the guest. Defendant
testified that there was some loose gravel and that the pavement was
slightly broken on the right-hand side; he could not tell whether
the brakes gave way or the wheels grabbed or what caused the truck
to go out of control. The case was submitted to the jury, which found
for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals held first that this was a proper case for
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It recognized that the
doctrine does not generally apply to motor vehicle accidents since the
circumstances are not ordinarily in the sole. control of either driver,
but declared that "where a motor vehicle, without apparent cause, runs
off the road and causes harm, the normal inference is that the driver
was negligent, and res ipsa loquitur is usually held to apply."27 This
view is followed by a good majority of the courts where -the vehicle
struck some person or object off the highway. In the instant case,
however, the action was in behalf of the automobile guest. Some
courts have declined to apply the doctrine here. Thus in Galbraith v.
Busch,'2 8 the New York Court of Appeals declares that the inference
is "equally great" that the accident was caused by the driver's lack
of care or by a defective condition of the vehicle. A driver owes no
duty to a gratuitous guest to use care to see that his vehicle-is in safe
condition and is liable only for a failure to disclose a hidden defect of
which he actually knows. This makes it improper to draw an inference
26. 36 Tenn. App. 469, 258 S.W.2d 782 (M.S. 1953). "The maxim res ipsa
loquitur means the facts of the occurrence evidence negligence; the circum-
stances unexplained justify an inference of negligence. In the principle of
proof employed, a case of res ipsa loquitur does not differ from an ordinary
case of circumstantial evidence. Res ipsa loquitur is not an arbitrary rule
but rather 'a common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial
evidence."' Id. at 474, 258 S.W.2d at 784.
27. Ibid.
28. 267- N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935).
1954]
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that the action was caused by negligence of which the plaintiff can
complain.
On the other hand a number of courts agree with the Tennessee
court in the Sullivan case. The case can be justified by the actual fact
that the chances are not at least "equally great" that the accident was
caused by defective condition of the vehicle. Statistics show that a
substantially greater proportion of accidents are caused by negligence
in driving rather than in the condition of the car. This makes the
inference of lack of care in driving still a permissible one.
29
The remainder of the opinion in the Sullivan case is devoted to a
consideration of the procedural effect of a res ipsa case. The court
describes the three rules which have been followed in this regard:
(1) an inference of negligence permitting the case to go the jury, (2)
a presumption of negligence giving rise to a directed verdict for
plaintiff unless rebutting evidence is introduced, and (3) a presump-
tion of negligence carrying with it a shifting of the ultimate burden of
proof to the defendant even though rebutting evidence is introduced.
It cites Tennessee cases in support of each rule and declares that the
"effect of a case of res ipsa loquitur, like that of any other case of
circumstantial evidence, varies from case to case, depending on the
particular facts of each case ... and the cogency of the inference of
negligence from such facts may of course vary in degree all the way
from practical certainty in one case to reasonable probability in
another."30
The conclusion is, however, that in the usual case the first rule listed
above applies, and the establishment of a case of res ipsa loquitur
"merely permits the jury to choose the inference of defendant's neg-
ligence in preference to other permissible or reasonable inferences."3' 1
The court therefore held that a jury verdict for the defendant should
be affirmed.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable in three
other cases. 32 None of them involved unusual features.
33
29. In the instant case defendant testified that the brakes could have given
way or that a wheel could have grabbed, but not that either one happened.
30. 36 Tenn. App. at 476, 477, 258 S.W.2d at 785.
31. Ibid.
32. These cases are: O'Brien v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 36 Tenn. App.
518, 259 S.W.2d 554 (M.S. 1952). Plaintiff was walking along a row of desks
in the offices of defendant when a man seated in a customer's chair at a desk
pushed his chair against her and knocked her down.
Memphis Street Ry. Co. v. Brown, 260 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
Passenger on a bus fell when the bus suddenly swerved and stopped. No
evidence of extraordinary jerk above that to be expected in traffic. Court
affected by circumstance that plaintiff did not inform the bus company in
any way for three months, and no other witness available.
Lawson v. Chattanooga, 263 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953). Defective
electric wiring which the city had not installed caused electrocution.
33. The best treatments of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are James, Proof
of the Breach in Negligence Cases, 37 VA. L. REv. 179 (1951); and Prosser, Res




There were two important cases involving causation problems dur-
ing the Survey period.
In McKinnon v. Michaud,4 defendant's agent was delivering gaso-
line to a filling station in a group of buildings belonging to the
plaintiff. The agent, Nickson, placed the hose from the truck into
the pipe for one of the tanks and went to the cab of his truck to read
a comic book though he had been warned by Marise, the operator of
the filling station, that the tank would not hold all the gasoline in
the truck. The tank overflowed and the gasoline ran under the door
from the storage room to the office. Seeing it close to an open kero-
sene stove Marise ran away. Nickson ran into the office and threw
some buckets of water on the gasoline with the idea of washing it
back into the storage room. This caused the gasoline to splash on the
stove, producing an explosion and fire.
Defendant contended that Nickson was acting outside the scope
of his employment in throwing the water on the gasoline. Without
conceding that this was true the court decided to treat this act as if it
were done by an independent third person. Even so, the court held,
the defendant would be liable. The act of Nickson in permitting the
tank to overflow was clearly "within the scope of 'his employment and
created a risk of harm to plaintiff's property." The later act in the
"attempt to prevent the gasoline from reaching the open stove was a
normal response to the emergency created by his negligent conduct.
This being the case, the primary negligence of the driver in causing
the overflow was the legal cause of the injury."3 5
The second act was an intervening act, but it was dependent in the
sense that it was produced by an attempt to avert the danger created
by the initial negligence. The court cites the Restatement of Torts36
in accord and the decision is clearly correct.
Wallace v.' Electric Power Board,3 7 the second case, raises a more
difficult problem. Defendants maintained a telephone pole at the
southeast corner of an intersection, supported by a guy wire attached
to a "stub pole" located on the northeast corner. Two cars collided
at the intersection and one of them struck the stub pole, cutting it off
and causing the guy wire to sag within three or four feet of the pave-
ment. Another car, driven by one Mongar, approaching at about 30
miles per hour, became entangled with the guy wire and the force of
SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS c. 6 (1954). Earlier Tennessee cases
are discussed in Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REV. 925
(1953).
34. 260 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
35. Id. at 724. It would perhaps have been better to say "a legal cause of the
injury." Actually there was no single legal cause since both acts contributed
in a substantial fashion toward producing the injury.
36. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 443 (1934).
37. 36 Tenn. App. 527, 259 S.W.2d 558 (E.S. 1953).
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the car in pulling the wire caused the telephone pole to topple and
fall into the street, striking plaintiff. There was evidence from which
a jury could find that the pole "was in a severely decayed condition
and that proper practice in the construction of such lines on public
streets would have dictated the use of a guy wire on the east of the
pole to compensate for stress resulting from wires leading off to the
west and particularly to a street light in the center of the intersection."
The trial court gave a directed verdict for the defendants and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
As I explained in last year's Torts Survey, Tennessee courts, like
those in most of the other states, have not laid down any single test
for proximate cause but have made many contradictory statements in
the opinions. In the instant case the court relied upon Moody v. Gulf
Ref. Co.,8 8 the case which lays down the strict foreseeability test. It
quoted the statement that "an injury which could not have been fore-
seen nor reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of
negligence is not actionable," and then finds that "reasonable minds
must conclude that the second pole fell as the result of the fortuitous
circumstances which defendants could not reasonably be required to
foresee."39 The result is perfectly consistent with the holding in the
Moody case and logically follows from an application of the test as
expressed therein.
But the opposite result might just as logically be reached under a
different test just as fully sanctioned by the courts. Take the test set
out in Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, cited in the instant case but not
quoted: "The majority of the well-considered cases, we think, apply
foreseeableness only as a test of negligence: whether defendant's
conduct created an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. If it did,
such cases hold defendant liable for all injuries within the reasonable
range of such risk, whether they could have been foreseen or not.
40
If the defendant's negligence was in allowing the telephone pole to
remain in a "severely decayed condition," what was the risk? That it
might fall or be toppled over and injure some one or some thing in
the vicinity. This is what happened and the precise steps in reaching
this result need not be foreseen and are not controlling.
If the negligence lay in the decayed condition of the pole, the real
question is whether this condition was a substantial factor in causing
the pole to fall.41 Was this negligence a cause in fact of the injury
38. 142 Tenn. 280, 218 S.W. 817, 8 A.L.R. 1243 (1920).
39. 36 Tenn. App. at 531, 533, 259 S.W.2d at 560, 561.
40. 31 Tenn. App. 12, 25, 211 S.W.2d 450, 455 (M.S. 1947). Later the court
says: "So the particular harm which actually befell [plaintiff] need not have
been foreseeable. It is enough that some such harm of a general character
was reasonably foreseeable as a likely result of defendant's failure to use due
care." Id. at 28, 211 S.W.2d at 457. See, also, Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels,
181 Tenn. 126, 178 S.W.2d 756 (1944).
41. The Supreme Court has in several cases indicated that the cause-in-fact
[ Vo,,. 7
or would the Mongar car (going at from 25 to 30 m.p.h.) have pulled
over a sound pole when it became entangled in the guy wire?42 This
is a fact decision, normally for the jury, but the court may decide as
a matter of law that there was no causal relation if it is sufficiently
convinced. Could this be what was really influencing the decision in
the Wallace dase?
Issues of proximate cause were raised in several other cases but they




The dominant impression to be gained from a survey of the several
cases involving contributory negligence last year is that plaintiff's
negligence is becoming less effective as a complete defense. Occasion-
ally there is a jury verdict for defendant apparently based on this
ground,44 but there were no cases in which defendant won on-this
basis as a matter of law.
45
Questions of causal relation of the plaintiff's negligence to the injury
test is the only one to be applied in determining proximate cause. See, e.g.,
Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Zopfi, 93 Tenn. 369, 24 S.W. 633 (1894); Dem-
ing & Co. v. Merchants' Cotton-Press Co., 90 Tenn. 306, 17 S.W. 89, 13 L.R.A.
518 (1891). These are the cases usually cited when a jury verdict for plaintiff
is sustained, just as the Moody case is usually cited when the case is taken out
of the hands of the jury and a decision rendered for defendant.
42. This is the analysis in the very similar case of Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal.
App.2d 681, 216 P.2d 119 (1950).
Plaintiff also contended that defendants were negligent in failing to have
a guy wire on the east of the pole to compensate for the stress resulting from
wires leading off to the west and particularly to a street light in the center
of the intersection. If this was negligence the injury did not come within
the scope of the risk since the stress of the electric and telephone wires had
nothing to do with the toppling of the pole.
43. These cases include:
Rural Education Ass'n v. Anderson, 261 S.W.2d, (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
Mentally deranged patient fell from second story window of hospital. Neither
his own actions nor failure of his relations to supply a special nurse was held
to cut off defendant's liability.
Gatlinburg Const. Co. v. McKinney, 263 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1953). Eight-year-old boy injured when he dropped a lighted match into
empty gasoline tank negligently permitted by defendant to remain on vacant
lot "playground." Neither his own actions nor failure of his mother to keep
him off the "playground" was held to cut off defendant's liability.
In Adams v. Brown, 262 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953); and Coffee v.
Logan, 262 S.W.2d. 82 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) the question was whether plain-
tiffs' negligence was a proximate cause of their injuries. The issue was held
for the jury in both cases.
44. Davidson v. Burger, 36 Tenn. App. 486, 259 S.W.2d 541 (M.S. 1952).
Even here the jury verdict for defendants was reversed as to one of the plain-
tiffs because there was no basis for finding her contributorily negligent. See
Hammons v. Walker Hauling Co., 263 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1953), where plain-
tiff ran into the rear of a truck trailer stopped at an intersection.
45. Cases in which the appellate court expressly held that the issue of
contributory negligence was properly left to the jury and a jury verdict for
the plaintiff was sustained include: Watts v. Town of Dickson, 36 Tenn. App.
678, 260 S.W.2d 206 (M.S. 1953) (plaintiff stepped in water meter box left open
by defendant); Gatlinburg Const. Co. v. McKinney, 263 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1953) (infant played on vacant lot with mother's acquiescence);
White v. Seier, 264 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) (highway collision.)
15] TORTS " .
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
are also held to be for the jury. This was held to be true even when
the plaintiff had violated a statute and was therefore guilty of negli-
gence per se.46 And the modification of the assured-clear-distance rule
in Strickland Transp. Co. v. Douglas4 7 has the effect of giving the jury
more discretion regarding the consequence to be attached to plaintiff's
conduct.
In two cases the doctrine of last clear chance was raised. One of
them is unimportant.48 The other is Hale v. Rayburn. A 17-year-old
girl stepped out of a north-bound car on the highway. She waited until
two other vehicles had passed and then started across. When she had
reached a point "about one step from the west edge of the pavement"
she was struck by defendant, going south, and killed. Defendant
claimed not to have seen the girl and contended that the trial court
erred in instructing that "even though the plaintiff ... was negligent,
yet if the defendant after discovering her peril, or by the exercise of
ordinary care should have discovered it, could have avoided the conse-
quence of such negligence by the exercise of ordinary care and failed
to do so, the defendant is liable." The Court of Appeals found that the
instruction was taken verbatim from the case of Harbor v. Wallace0
and held that it was an accurate expression of the law, properly given
in this case.
This is the first outright holding that the doctrine of last clear chance
is this broad in its application in Tennessee. There have been earlier
cases either holding or stating that the so-called doctrine of discovered
peril is applicable so that a negligent plaintiff can recover when the de-
fendant realized his situation and then failed to exercise due care,51
just as there are decisions suggesting that the so-called humanitarian
doctrine is applicable so that knowledge by the defendant of plaintiff's
situation may not be required if defendant is a railroad or a street car
company operating what is characterized as a dangerous instrumen-
tality.52 But on several occasions the courts have indicated that this is
46. Adams v. Brown, 262 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) (plaintiff, passing
a truck at an intersection, was struck when the truck driver turned left without
signalling). See also Coffee v. Logan, 262 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953)
(plaintiffs, deviating from a crosswalk, were struck by a car); McKinnon v.
Michaud, 260 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953) (physical condition and
arrangement of buildings destroyed by fire).
47. 264 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
48. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953). Here the
court simply stated that the charge on last clear chance was more favorable
to the defendant, who was complaining, than to the plaintiff and passed over
the matter.
49. 264 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
50. 31 Tenn. App. 1, 7, 211 S.W.2d 172, 175 (W.S. 1946).
51. In Short Way Lines v. Thomas, 34 Tenn. App. 641, 241 S.W.2d 875
(E.S. 1951), plaintiff was allowed to recover on the basis of discovered peril
Numerous other cases, including those cited in the next two footnotes, refer
to the doctrine.
52. The initial and still leading case is Todd v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Rty.,
135 Tenn. 92, 185 S.W. 62 (1915).
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the extent of the doctrine of last clear chance and that it should not
be applied to the situation where an ordinary defendant negligently,
failed to discover plaintiff's predicament.53 The quotation from Harbor
v. Wallace,4 used in the instance case, was a mere dictum, since the
court held that the doctrine of last clear chance was completely in-
applicable and therefore had no occasion to consider carefully its
attributes.
If the position of the Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals in
the instant case-Hale v. Rayburn-is now followed by the Supreme
Court and the other sections, the doctrine of last, clear chance will
be applied where the defendant fails to discover plaintiff's predica-
ment. This position is adopted in a number of states and has the
approval of the Restatement.55 There is one restriction on it, however,
which is not adverted to in either Harbor or the instant case, and
which needs to be made clear. This is that it applies only where the
plaintiff has become unable to extricate himself from his predicament
and not where the plaintiff has merely failed to observe his peril and
to do anything about it. In the last situation there is no difference
between the conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant. The negli-
gence of both remains active and concurrent until the time of the
impact, and there is no basis for holding that either has the last clear
chance.
There were no cases during the year referring specifically to Ten-
nessee's unique doctrine of remote contributory negligence, though a
number of the cases must have involved its application. This doctrine
is much broader in its scope than that of last clear chance and should
really incorporate it. The treatment of "remote" contributory negli-
gence as not barring recovery but merely mitigating damages has
much of merit in it but greatly needs clarification. A legislative act
making explicit the good features of the doctrine seems to be highly
desirable.
7. Damages
Attention was given to the measure of damages in several cases.
Two involved unusually large amounts. In Olson v. Sharpe,5 6 where
the jury awarded $100,000 for personal injuries, the court declared
that the amount was "far in excess of any amount previously con-
sidered by the Supreme Court or by this Court in personal injury
cases." After "mature consideration" it affirmed with a remittitur to
53. The Todd case, supra note 52, indicates as much. See the thorough dis-
cussion in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Day, 10 Tenn. App. 334 (E.S. 1929).
And see Tennessee Central Ry. v. Ledbetter, 159 Tenn. 404, 19 S.W.2d 258
(1929); Hemmer v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 24 Tenn. App. 42, 139
S.W.2d 698 (M.S. 1940); Hadley v. Morris, 35 Tenn. App. 534, 249 S.W.2d 295
(W.S. 1951).
54. 31 Tern. App. 1, 211 S.W.2d 172 (W.S. 1946), supra note 50.
55. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 479 (1934).
56. 36 Tenn. App. 557, 259 S.W.2d 867 (E.S. 1953).
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$80,000. In Monday v. Millsaps,5 a few months later, it received a case
involving a verdict for $109,000 in which the trial judge had ordered a
remittitur to $90,000. The judgment was affirmed. Both cases involved
very serious and extensive injuries, and in both cases the court quoted
from'an earlier case the statement that "it is the duty of the courts to
take into consideration the nature and extent of the injuries, the suffer-
ing, expenses, diminution of earning capacity, inflation and high cost of
living, age, expectancy of life and amount awarded in other similar
cases."58 A verdict for $35,000 for personal injuries was affirmed in
Thoni v. Hayborn,59' with some very quotable remarks by Judge
Hickerson. White v. Seier60 involved a plaintiff who already had an
injured back which had improved and was now injured again. It
also raised the question of whether plaintiff had used "reasonable dili-
gence to minimize his damage by waiting eleven weeks before going
to a doctor." The measure of damages in a death action was considered
in Rural Education Ass'n v. Anderson."' The decedent had been in
very poor health and the court declared that the "amount awarded by
the jury would indicate that they took into consideration his state of
health, expectancy, and other relevant factors in estimating the dam-
ages."8
2
The measure of damages for damage to property was considered in
McKinnon v. Michaud.6' It was held that the trial court "was correct in
instructing the jury that in arriving at the difference between the
value of the premises immediately before and after the fire they could
take into consideration the -reasonable cost of restoring the property
to its former condition allowing for depreciation" but held that the
court should have added that if the jury "found the reasonable cost
of restoring the property to its former condition was less than the
difference in the value immediately before and after the fire, the
reasonable cost of reconstruction would be the measure of damages."0
4
8. Particular Fact Situations and Relationships
(a) Traffic and Transportation
A majority of the Torts cases during the Survey period have in-
volved some form of traffic and transportation. Of course, the bulk
of these cases dealt with automobiles. There were numerous cases
57. 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
58. The quotation is from France v. Newman, 35 Tenn. App. 486, 497, 248
S.W.2d 392, 396 (E.S. 1951).
59. 260 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
60. 264 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
61. 261 S.W.2d 151 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
62. Id. at 156-57. For complete discussion, see Gamble, Actions for Wrongful
Death in Tennessee, 4 VAmm. L. REV. 289 (1951).
63. 260 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
64. Id. at 727, 728.
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involving collision of two motor vehicles,65 and several where a car
hit a pedestrian.66
These cases have been discussed in the general treatment of negli-
gence and there is little which can be added specifically-here. Several
cases indicated that a motorist must be on the lookout for negligent
conduct on the part of others,67 and in Strickland Transp. Co. v. Doug-
1=168 the court delivered some quotable remarks on the duty of the
motorist in this "motor age."69 In Shew v. Bailey,70 the court declared
that neither a failure to see another vehicle nor an error in judgment
in concluding that a collision would be avoided will amount to gross
negligence.
"The general rule is that one who turns his automobile over to one
under the influence of an intoxicant, or to one addicted to the' use of
intoxicants to excess, or to a driver who is known to the party loaning
the car to be a reckless or negligent or otherwise incompetent driver, is
charged with negligence." This quotation comes from Rowan v.
Sauls,7' where the Supreme Court held that the rule did not apply to
a defendant who allowed a 24-year-old college student to drive his
car, even though the student 'had a temporarily restricted license due
to the fact that he was a recent immigrant.
The relationship of driver and automobile guest was presented in
65. Hammons v. Walker Hauling Co., 263 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1953); Scates v.
Board of Comm'rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1954); Davidson v.
Burger, 36 Tenn. App. 486, 259 S.W.2d 541 (M.S. 1952); Wallace v. Electric
Power Board, 36 Tenn. App. 527, 259 S.W.2d 558 (E.S. 1953) (other intervening
forces produced the injury); Shew v. Bailey, 260 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1951) (car and motorcycle); Adams v. Brown, 262 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1953) (car and truck); Harding v. Moore, 262 S.W.2d 702 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1953); Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) (car and
truck); Strickland Transp. Co. v. Douglas, 264 S.W. 2d 233 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1953 (car and parked trailer); White v. Seier, 264 S.W.2d (Tenn. App. E.S.
1953).
66. Olson v. Sharpe, 36 Tenn. App. 557, 259 S.W.2d 867 (E.S. 1953) (truck
backing on road being paved); Coffee v. Logan, 262 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1953) (intersection); Hale v. Rayburn, 264 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1953) (middle of highway).
67. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953); Hale v. Ray-
burn, 264 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
68. 264 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
69. "We live in a motor age and with the tremendous increase in the num-
ber of motor vehicles using our streets and highways, a new yardstick must
be used to measure the standard of due caution and reasonable care in the
operation of motor vehicles on our highways. No longer can he rely on slow
speed, good brakes and a proper lookout ahead. The modern motorist must
not only keep a proper lookout ahead, but also must watch traffic and pedes-
trians on each side and to the rear. Obviously he cannot look in all directions
at the same time. Formerly the exercise of due care required the motorist
to drive within the range of his lights,- Under existing highway conditions,
a motorist would cause unbelievable havoc if he attempted to slow down or
stop his car every time he was faced with the hazard of driving into a blind
spot caused by the lights of an approaching car." Id. at 237.
70. 260 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).. ,




Sullivan v. Crabtree,72 but it does not seem to have affected the de-
cision. Normally a gratuitous guest is entitled to the exercise of due
care only in the act of driving and not in regard to the condition of
the vehicle. As to the latter he is entitled only to be warned of known
latent defects.
A paying passenger on a common carrier, on the other hand, is en-
titled to 'the highest degree of care and foresight."' 3 Despite this,
plaintiffs were unable to recover in the two cases involving common
carriers. In Memphis Street Ry. v. Brown,74 a passenger who claimed
to have been injured by a sudden swerve and stop of a bus was un-
able to prove negligence. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Katzman75 in-
volves the duty of a carrier to protect passengers against third per-
sons. In this case a passenger was assaulted by a military policeman,
but the court held that there was no evidence to show that the rail-
road "should reasonably have anticipated the occurrence," since there
was no indication that there had ever been any previous trouble be-
tween MP's and civilians or that defendant had given MP's authority
over civilians.
The care required by a city in maintaining its streets is considered
in Knoxville v. Cooper.7 6 Here, a man travelling on a motorcycle hit
a slight depression near a manhole in the street, was thrown against
the curb and killed. A jury verdict for plaintiff was reversed and the
case dismissed, the court saying that a "municipality is not required
to keep its streets and sidewalks in perfect condition and free from
slight holes or depressions, though it may be held liable for injuries
caused by defects in the nature of traps."
77
(b) Public Utilities
Two cases involve the liability of gas or electric companies for in-
juries produced by defective conditions in the private home of a
consumer.
In Lawson v. Chattanooga,8 the court repeated a statement fre-
quently made before: "Where a company merely transmits its electric
current from its line to the consumer's wires, which it did not install
and does not control, it has no duty to inspect such wires and is not
liable for injury caused by defects in them .... But where the com-
pany knows of such a defect its duty is to stop and not to send its.
deadly current into the defective wiring of the consumer, and it is
liable for injuries to person or property caused by breach of this
72. 36 Tenn. App. 469, 258 S.W.2d 782 (M.S. 1953).
73. Knoxville Cab Co. v. Miller, 176 Tenn. 88, 91, 138 S.W.2d 428, 429 (1940).
74. 260 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
75. 195 Tenn. 127, 258 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1953).
76. 265 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
77. Id. at 896. Cf. also Memphis v. Uselton, 260 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1953) (injury resulting while street being widened).
78. 263 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
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duty." 9 There was no evidence in the case that defendant knew of the
defective condition and an inspection of one circuit when an electric
range was installed involved no obligation to inspect the other cir-
cuits. A provision of the Building Code giving the city electrician
the authority to inspect houses was held not to affect the result and
the defendant was held not liable.
In Evens v. Young,80 a gas water heater exploded because it had
been installed in a closet too small for the oxygen requirements. There
were allegations that the defendant gas company had inspected the
installations when the house was built and that it knew or should
have known of the hazardous condition at the time it connected the
pipes of the house with the gas line and that it failed to warn the
plaintiff of the danger. The Supreme Court held that a demurrer was
properly sustained. It said: "Where the injury occurred as the result
of gas escaping from defective pipes or appliances, owned by the con-
sumer, the burden is on the Plaintiff to show that there was a defec-
tive condition, for the repair of which the Company was responsible."
8'
This statement is exceedingly broad and seems to be inconsistent
with the statement quoted above regarding electricity, which has been
frequently made by the Supreme Court itself. Surely if the gas com-
pany had notice that gas was escaping from the pipes in the home
of a consumer and failed after proper notice to cut off the gas, it would
not be relieved of liability because it was not responsible for the re-
pair of the pipes in the consumer's house.8
2
There are three differences between this situation and the facts of
the Evens case. In Evens: (1) the pipes were not leaking and the
danger was not imminently portending but was simply potential, (2)
the inspection took place prior to plaintiff's purchase of the house, and
(3) it was alleged only that defendant should have known of the
dangerous condition, not that it was actually aware of it. Each of
these circumstances is referred to in the opinion, but somewhat ob-
liquely, and it is not possible to tell what precise significance each has.
Lawson v. Chattanooga seems to suggest that if the utility makes an
inspection of a consumer's wiring (or pipes) before connecting with
the supply line and negligently fails to discover a defect which re-
sults in damage, the utility may be held liable. Does Evens contradict
this?
Wallace v. Electric Power Board83 involves the liability of a utility
79. Id. at 541, citing numerous Tennessee cases, including the recent case of
Dabbs v. Tennessee Valey Authority, 194 Tenn. 185, 250 S.W.2d 67 (1952).
80. 264 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1954).
81. Id. at 583.
82. Even Conway v. Philadelphia Gas Works Co., 336 Pa. 11, 7 A.2d 326
(1939), the case cited for the quotation above, expressly declares that there
would be liability under these circumstances.
83. 36 Tenn. App. 527, 259 S.W.2d 558 (E.S. 1953).
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for allowing a telephone pole to become decayed. Liability was denied
on grounds of proximate cause.
(c) Hospitals
Rural Education Ass'n, Inc. v. Anderson4 involved an action against
a hospital for the death of a mentally deranged patient who jumped
or fell from a second-story window. The court sustained a jury verdict
for the plaintiff, saying that "A private hospital owes a duty to give
its patient such reasonable care and attention for his safety as his
physical and mental condition may require; and it must use reasonable
care to safeguard him against any known or reasonably apprehended
danger to himself due to his mental derangement."85
Defendant's contention that it did not have a sufficient staff of
nurses and attendants to supply full-time supervision to this patient
and that it had requested the plaintiff (patient's wife) to supply a
special nurse, was held not to "relieve defendant from its duty to
see that this patient who was in extremis was given such attention as
his condition apparently rendered necessary for his protection." 80
Another asserted defense was that the medical director, acting not in
this capacity but as patient's physician, reached a "medical decision"
not to move the patient from the second floor or to tie him in his bed,
so that the nurses "could not be found negligent for following this
medical decision of the patient's physician." The court answered that
the testimony showed the patient was so irrational that he could not
be handled and that it "is a matter of common knowledge and common
sense of laymen that a patient in such a condition should be watched
and protected and not left unattended on an upper story by an un-
guarded window through which he might, and ultimately did, fall or
jump to his death."
87
(d) Landowners
To a business guest or invitee a landowner owes a duty to exercise
due care to make his premises safe. This was recognized in two cases
but in neither instance was the defendant found to be negligent. In
Phillips v. Harvey Co.,88 plaintiff alleged that she tripped over an
obstruction in a department store, but she could tell nothing about
the obstruction; a demurrer was sustained. In O'Brien v. Southern
84. 261 S.W.2d 151 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
85. Id. at 154, citing numerous Tennessee and other cases and Harbison, The
Standard of Care Owed by a Hospital to Its Patients, 2 VAND. L. Rsv. 66D
(1949).
86. 261 S.W.2d at 155. This would probably not mean that a hospital must
alvays keep on hand an adequate staff for even an extraordinary emergency.
87. Ibid. Homer v. Cookeville, 36 Tenn. App. 535, 259 S.W.2d 561 (M.S.
1952) involved an action against a city as a operator of a hospital for injuries
received by an infant while in an incubator, but the case turned on a pro-
cedural issue and did not reach the merits.
88. 264 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. 1954).
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Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,89 plaintiff had gone to defendant's offices to pay
a bill. As she was leaving a man seated in a customer's seat by a desk
pushed his chair against her and knocked her down. A directed
verdict for defendant was affIrmed.
The landowner does not owe trespassers a duty to use care to make
his premises safe. In most states there has developed an exception
to this rule in the case of certain infant trespassers, under the so-called
attractive nuisance doctrine. Tennessee -has followed the minority,
restricted view of the scope of the doctrine, to the effect that it does
not apply unless the child was attracted on the land by a dangerous
condition which itself produced his injuryY° This restriction in Ten-
nessee is partially compensated by the so-called "playground theory."
The court applied this theory in Gatlinburg Const. Co. v. McKinney91
and defined its basis as being "that if an owner of land knows that
children of tender years habitually play upon his land to the extent
that it becomes known as a playground for children, he is bound to
exercise ordinary care to see that his premises are reasonably safe for
the purpose and is duty bound not to permit them to be exposed to a
known danger."
92
The two Tennessee doctrines when combined come close to approxi-
mating the majority interpretation of the attractive nuisance doctrine,
as expressed in the Restatement.Ae They are more hemmed in by
technical requirements, however, and leave less to the sound discretion
of judge and jury, and it is encouraging to observe that the court
cited the Restatement in the Gatlinburg case. This citation and some
of Judge McAmis' language suggest that the two Tennessee doctrines
may soon merge into the Restatement position.
In Gatlinburg, an eight-year-old child was injured when he tossed
a lighted match into an empty gasoline tank which defendant had
left on a vacant lot. The boy's act was held not to break the chain of
causation, and neither the boy nor his mother was found guilty of
contributory negligence.
89. 36 Tenn. App. 518, 259 S.W.2d 554 (M.S. 1952).
90. For citation and discussion of the cases, see Noel, The Attractive Nuisance
Doctrine in Tennessee, 21 TENN. L. REv. 658 (1951); 20 TENN. L. Rav. 765 (1949);
2 VAND. L. REV. 716 (1949).
91. 263 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953), 23 TENN. L. REV. 448 (1954).
92. Id. at 767. The language is taken almost verbatim from Williams v.
Morristown, 32 Tenn. App. 274, 287, 222 S.W.2d 607, 612 (M.S. 1949).
93. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339. This section provides: "A possessor of land
is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon
caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon
the land if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know
and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and




In Evens v. Young,9 4 a gas water heater exploded, allegedly because
it had been installed in a closet too small to provide a sufficient supply
of oxygen. Plaintiff sued the Central Equipment & Supply Co., which
had supplied the heater and installed it. There was nothing wrong
with the heater itself and the installation was in accordance with the
directions of the builder, who later sold to the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court held that defendant's demurrer to the declaration was properly
sustained.
For many years a manufacturer or supplier of a chattel was held
to owe no duty to use care regarding the condition of the chattel to
persons with whom he was not in privity of contract. Exceptions to
this rule gradually become so extensive that the rule itself was
changed. Practically all of the states today, probably including Ten-
nessee, hold that privity of contract is no longer a necessary element
to an action against a manufacturer for injuries produced by dangerous
condition of a chattel which could have been avoided by due care.Y
The original requirement of privity of contract was also adopted
regarding work of an independent contractor which was accepted by
the person with whom he made the contract. But the development
of the law as to contractors "has tended to lag some twenty or thirty
years behind"9 6 the law as to manufacturers and sellers.
In the instant case, where the installation was in accord with the
instructions of the builder-employer, and the danger was created not
by negligence in the manner of installation but by the instructions
themselves, the majority of the courts would agree that the contractor
is not liable.91 Previous Tennessee authority sustains the holding. 8
(f) Vendors
Evens v. Young" also raises the question of the liability of the
vendor of a house to the vendee for injuries suffered because of a
dangerous condition. Defendant Young was the architect, the builder
and the vendor of the house. He had originally designed a closet under
a stairway for an electric water heater but had later changed to a gas
water heater. The closet was alleged to be too small to afford an ade-
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
94. 264 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1954).
95. For discussion of the Tennessee cases, see Noel, Products Liability of a
Manufacturer in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REV. 985 (1953); Wade, Book Review,
22 TENN. L. REV. 444 (1952). For a good general treatment, see PROSSErt, TORTS
§ 83 (1941).
96. SMITH AND PROSSER, CASES ON TORTS 886 (1952).
97. See PROSSER, TORTS § 84.
98. The court cites Hester v. Hubbuch, 26 Tenn. App. 246, 170 S.W.2d 922
(E.S. 1942). For discussion of additional cases, see 22 TENN. L. REV. 308 (1952).
99. 264 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1954).
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quate supply of oxygen, and some two or three years after the sale,
when an unusual amount of hot water was used, the 'heater exploded.
The Supreme Court held that a demurrer to the declaration was
properly sustained.
The ruling was based on the earlier decision of Smith v. Tucker 00
holding that the rule of caveat emptor applies to the sale of real estate
and that the vendor is not required to disclose a dangerous condition
of the premises. Caveat emptor may eliminate an implied warranty
or any other action based on contract; it takes an additional fiat to
hold that no action can be based on negligence because the vendor
owes no duty to the vendee to use care.
Historically there may be a substanital difference between sales of
land and sales of chattels. But from the standpoint of the general
integrity of tort law and pervading principles of negligence, it would
seem that a person who sells a dangerous thing, whether it be real
or personal property, should be liable for injuries caused by his failure
to use care or at least for his failure to disclose known dangers. Some
day there will be a MacPherson decision'0 1 regarding real property;
and the Supreme Court, while sustained by authority in Evens, lost
a splendid opportunity to render a decision which might well proceed
to become the leading authority in the country.
The eventual rule may perhaps not impose liability upon the casual
seller of his own secondhand house for failure to discover a dangerous
condition. But the defendant in Evens was selling a new house and
was apparently in the business of building and selling houses. On
general policy grounds, is there any reason to distinguish him from
a manufacturer and seller of chattels?
. The Evens case and Smith v. Tucker clearly indicate a gap in the
law of torts since their effect is to hold that there is no relief against
anyone, not on the ground of lack of negligence but on the ground that
there is no duty to exercise care or perhaps even to do anything about
a known dangerous condition.
Indeed, the court might well have held for the plaintiff without
modifying the present state of the law on vendor and vendee. De-
fendant was not just the vendor; he was the architect and builder of
the house and himself designed and constructed the dangerous con-
dition. On the basis of such cases as Hale v. Depaoli,102 he could
properly be held liable on this ground without reference to the fact
that he was the vendor.
100. 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66, 41 A.L.R. 830 (1925).
101. Judge Cardozo's decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440 (1916), is universally recognized as
creating the modern law on tort liability of manufacturers and sellers.
102. 33 Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948). This is a very strong opinion holding
that the jury might find a contractor liable for the defective condition of the
railing of an upstairs porch, though he had sold the house and had sometime




-. 1. Assault and Battery
In Garner v. State ex rel. Askins,'03 a constable, arresting the plain-
tiff for a traffic violation, cursed him, jerked him out of his truck and
struck him several times on the face and head with a blackjack,
lacerating him and fracturing his skull. The jury awarded- $4,000
compensating damages and $50 punitive damages. The trial court
granted a remittitur of $3,300; but the appellate court found this to be
error.
It declared that the plaintiff's guilt of a traffic offense should not
affect the amount of damage since it "could not justify or mitigate
the constable's savage attack upon the prisoner in his custody." Com-
pensation should be awarded "for all his injuries-those already suf-
fered and those he is reasonably certain to suffer-including an allow-
ance for his physical pain and mental anguish, for the affront to his
personality, the indignity, disgrace, humiliation and mortification to
which he was subjected by the conduct of this peace officer." 0 4
2. False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution
In Bricker v. Sims, 0 5 the City of Martin had passed a curfew law
and plaintiff had been arrested for being out on the street after the
designated hour. Claiming that the ordinance was unconstitutional
he brought an action for false imprisonment against the city, the
mayor and board of aldermen, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff who
arrested him. The Supreme Court held that even assuming that the
ordinance was unconstitutional demurrers by each of the defendants
were properly sustained. The city, the mayor and board of aldermen
were all entitled to governmental immunity. The sheriff (and deputy
sheriff) was not liable because it was not his function to determine
whether or not the ordinance was constitutional. In the absence of
a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality he was under a duty to
enforce it.
Streetman v. Richardson'06 was a suit "for false arrest and malicious
prosecution." It was alleged that one defendant maliciously and with-
out probable cause swore out a warrant against plaintiff charging him
with fraudulently obtaining property by means of a worthless check
and that a second defendant testified before the grand jury which
relationship had no connection with the liability.) Though the injury oc-
curred 18 years after the house was built, the court held that the mere pas-
sage of time presented a question of fact and Hot of law in determining
whether the danger was "inherent" or "imminent."
103. 266 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
104. Id. at 364.
105. 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953).
106. 266 S.W.2d 838 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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indicted the plaintiff. Plaintiff was acquitted in the criminal prosecu-
tion and sues these two defendants and a third one who was apparently
their employer. The employees did not make any defense or appeal
the verdict against all three defendants. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, with a remittitur, and considered only the question of whether
the employer was responsible for the acts of the other two. The court's
statement of facts indicates a case of malicious prosecution but no
basis for an action of false imprisonment. 07
3. Defamation
Hayslip v. Wellford"'s is the second suit arising from a single fact
situation. Plaintiff, a high school teacher in Memphis, had made
charges of immorality in the school. A grand jury investigated, found
no evidence of the immorality and in its report charged that she ,had
"viciously maligned" the school and that "her continued employment
... would be ... a disservice to the community." She filed a motion
to expunge the remarks from the report of the grand jury. The trial
judge denied the motion and in the case of Hayslip v. State109 a
divided Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that while by the
majority rule charges against private persons are not within the
authority of the grand jury when not followed by an indictment, the
question of whether it should be expunged is within the discretion
of the trial court.
The present action was one of libel brought against the members of
the grand jury. The Supreme Court held that the statements were
subject to an absolute privilege. It said that the members of the grand
jury are entitled to the same privileges as the judge is in a trial.
Though the grand jury may have made an error of judgment and
exceeded its authority in placing the criticisms in the report, the act
was still a judicial act "entitled to the protection of privilege just the
same as if this finding had been an indictment or a presentment.' 10
The position that the grand jury is entitled to the absolute privilege
of a judicial proceeding is adopted by a majority of the American
states. There is disagreement, however, as to whether the privilege
extends to a report of an investigation not resulting in an indictment.m
107. There sems to be no thought in this case of applying the principles
enunciated in (Blue) Star Service, Inc. v. McCurdy, 36 Tenn. App. 1, 251
S.W.2d 139 (W.S. 1952), which I discussed at length in last year's Survey.
Wade, Torts-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VA=. L. REV. 990, 1006-11 (1953).
There are said to have been some unpublished opinions based on the doctrine
of this case and it will be most interesting to see what the courts finally make
of it.
108. 263 S.W.2d 136 (Tenn. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 911 (1953).
109. 193 Tenn. 643, 249 S.W.2d 882 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952),
6 VAND L. REV. 134.
110. 263 S.W.2d at 138.
111. A qualified privilege was held to exist in Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa 302
(1860). No privilege was held to exist in Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub. Co.,
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An absolute privilege is given to judges, grand juries, legislatures,
etc. "in the interest of public welfare that [they] should be allowed
to express their sentiments and speak their minds fully and fear-
lessly."' n 2 Perhaps we should not be too technical in determining
whether they are acting within the exact scope of their authority and
jurisdiction. But it is unfortunate that no relief of any kind is avail-
able to the traduced person. The plaintiff in the Hayslip case was
apparently far more interested in vindicating and justifying herself
than in obtaining monetary damages. Could not an opportunity to
prove what she claims to be the falsity of the statement be made avail-
able to her and to the victims of irresponsible statements by legislators
and Congressmen? We would then promote the policy behind the
absolute privilege by refusing to impose financial responsibility upon
the person publishing the remark, but we give the "victim" a legal
opportunity to protect his name and reputation against false accusa-
tions."13
4. Strict Liability
In State ex rel. George v. Fleming,114 defendants, a sheriff and a
contractor, were in the process of raising a radio tower next to plain-
tiff's property. After it had been completed to a height of 110 feet it
blew over in a windstorm, causing damage to plaintiff's property.
Plaintiff sued for damages, and "the theory of the declaration was
that the erection of the tower and the scaffolding was an inherently
dangerous occupation, within the rule of strict liability which is ap-
plied in such things as dynamite, electricity, gas, and blasting." The
Court of Appeals held, however, that there was "no proof that erec-
tion of this tower and scaffolding was necessarily dangerous, or ultra-
hazardous, or involved any more risk than the erection of any other
common structures, such as buildings, etc."'15 For this reason and




Six cases involved some aspect of joint torts. Olson v. Sharpe"" in-
volved the question of whether the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts
181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913); and Bennett v. Stockwell, 197 Mich. 50, 163
N.W. 482, L.R.A. 1917F 761 (1917).
112. NEWELL, SLANDER AN LIBEL 387 (4th ed. 1924).
113. Compare the description of the "lie bill" as used in Arkansas, in Leflar,
Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 Am. L. REv. 423 (1952). This article gives
careful consideration to various types of remedies for defamatory statements.
114. 264 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
115. Id. at 591. It cited Cash v. Case-Hedges Co., 139 Tenn. 179, 201 S.W.
347 (1917), holding that the rule of strict liability did not apply to erection
of a smokestack.
116. 36 Tenn. App. 557, 259 S.W.2d 867 (E.S. 1953).
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in finding a servant not liable and the master liable. It was found that
there was no inconsistency since the master's liability was not im-
posed on the ground of respondeat superior but on the ground that
the master was itself negligent in failing to supply a flagman. In
Hammons v. Walker Hauling Co.," 7 the trial court granted a directed
verdict for one defendant and the jury found for the other, which had
pleaded lack of negligence on its part and contributory negligence on
plaintiff's part. The Court of Appeals found that the directed verdict
was erroneous, but affirmed on the ground that the jury verdict for
the second defendant amounted to a holding of contributory negligence
which would apply in plaintiff's action against the first defendant. This
was reversed by the Supreme Court. It declared that since the jury
verdict was general, there was no indication as to the basis of the
finding against plaintiff so that res adjudicata could not apply.
Homer v. Cookeville"8 draws a distinction between a release and
a covenant not to sue. A release of one joint tortfeasor has the effect
of discharging the other. The instrument in question, however, was
held to be a covenant not to sue and left the plaintiff's action against
the second tortfeasor intact.
Three cases involved actions for contribution between joint tort-
feasors." 9 They are discussed in more detail in the article on Resti-
tution.
2. Governmental Immunity
When a municipality is engaged in a governmental function it is
not subject to tort liability. Thus in Bricker v. Sims,20 neither the
city nor the mayor and board of aldermen were liable for passing an
ordinance, claimed to be unconstitutional, which resulted in plaintiff's
arrest. The Supreme Court held in Scates v. Board of Comm'rs of
Union City'-' that this immunity applies to a cross-declaration as well
as to an original cause of action.
But if the city is engaged in a proprietary function it may be held
liable for negligence. Thus it may be liable for negligence in con-
nection with the supplying of water or electricity 22 or in connection
with the construction or maintenance of streets. 23
117. 263 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1953).
118. 36 Tenn. App. 535, 259 S.W.2d 561 (M.S. 1952).
119. American Cas. Co. v. Billingsley, 260 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. 1953); Vaughn
v. Gill, 264 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. 1953); Allbright Bros. v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209
F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).
120. 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953).
121. 265 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1954).
122. See Watts v. Town of Dickson, 36 Tenn. App. 678, 260 S.W.2d 206
(M.S. 1953) (top left off water meter box-town held liable); Lawson v.
Chattanooga, 263 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953) (electricity-city not
negligent).
123. Memphis v. Uselton, 260 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953) (widening
street-city liable); Knoxville v. Cooper, 265 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1953) (small depression in street-city not negligent).
1954] "973
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3. Statutory Actions
Actions under the Federal Employers Liability Act were brought
in two cases but in both instances the plaintiff was unable to prove
negligence. 124 In Thoni v. Hayborn,125 the defendant employer had
elected not to come under the state workmen's compensation act and
since the employment was found not to be "casual" the defendant was
unable to rely upon the common law defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was
affirmed.
124. Chaffin v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R., 36 Tenn. Ap. 580, 259 S.W.2d
877 (M.S. 1953); Hawkins v. Clinchfield R.R., 266 S.W.2d 840 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1953).
125. 260 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
